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China Is Bluffing in 
the Trade War 
Chinese leaders say they can effectively retaliate against Trump’s tariffs. 
They’re wrong. 
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U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war with China is about to get real. 
Until this point, not much has happened, because the 25 percent tariffs on 
Chinese goods that the Trump administration announced in May did not 
apply to goods already in transit. That created a four- to six-week window 
of opportunity for U.S. and Chinese negotiators to come to an agreement 
and avoid the implementation of the duties. 
That window is now closing, and with no deal in sight, speculation has 
turned to how China might respond. With Chinese official media vowing no 
compromise in negotiations with the United States, the country seems to be 
settling in for a protracted siege. 
Considering that China ran a trade surplus of $420 billion with the United 
States last year, it is obvious that it can’t come close to matching the United 
States in terms of tit-for-tat tariffs. But it does have other arrows in its 
quiver. Expert commentary and internet speculation have focused on three: 
an embargo on imports of soybeans from the United States, an embargo on 
exports of rare earth metals to the United States, and the diversification of 
China’s currency reserves away from the dollar. 
Fortunately for the United States—and for the health of the global trading 
system—each of these would be an empty threat. 
In 2018, as rhetoric about the trade war took off in earnest, China slapped a 
punitive tariff of 25 percent on American soybeans. Soybeans are the 
United States’ biggest farm export, and they are important crops in the 
Midwestern states that swung to elect Trump in 2016. The 25 percent duty 
has been widely cited as the root cause of low prices that have led to a wave 
of farm foreclosures across the U.S. heartland. 
The United States’ largest competitor in the global soybean market is 
Brazil, so one might expect Brazilian farmers to be jumping with joy as they 
see more demand for their produce. But Brazilian soybean prices 
have fallen almost 20 percent since April 2018, almost exactly matching 
the slightly over 20 percent fall in U.S. soybean prices for that period. 
The reason is simple: Soybeans are fungible. When China buys Brazilian 
soybeans instead of American ones, Europeans have to turn to soybeans 
from the United States to replace their usual Brazilian supplies. There is 
one, single, undifferentiated global market for soybeans. Squeeze it in one 
place, and it just pops out in another. 
Indeed, the decline in soybean prices is global, and it has nothing to do with 
the U.S.-China trade war. It’s all about the African swine fever. The 
majority of the world’s soybeans feed pigs and other animals, not people, 
and China’s pork producers have been hit with a nationwide fever 
epidemic. 
As a result, Chinese purchases of U.S. soybeans have now stopped 
completely. That may look like a total soybean embargo. But the reality is 
that China just doesn’t need as many soybeans, because it doesn’t have as 
many pigs to feed. As the swine fever continues to rage, look for U.S. 
exports of pork products to boom.  
China is by far the world’s largest producer of rare earth metals: elements 
such as neodymium, europium, terbium, and dysprosium that are crucial to 
the production of some advanced materials and electronics. Despite their 
name, rare earths really aren’t so rare, and, in fact, the United States was 
the world’s major producer until cheap Chinese sources undercut the 
market in the 1980s. 
The United States still has plenty of rare earth metals, but the 
environmental costs of extracting them from the underlying ores are too 
high to make production economic. Refining the minerals is only cheap in 
China because of the country’s lax environmental standards. If China does 
place a global embargo on the export of rare earths, prices will go up to 
reflect the metals’ true economic costs, which would actually be a good 
thing (from an environmental perspective). 
Anything less than a total global embargo, however, would be useless, 
since, even more so than soybeans, rare earths are entirely fungible. China 
found that out in 2010, when it slapped an embargo on rare earth exports 
to Japan. Analyses a few years later found thatthe export ban had virtually 
no ill effect. If China sells them to anyone, U.S. companies can just buy 
them secondhand or switch to alternative inputs to their industrial 
processes. 
China holds an estimated $1.1 trillion of U.S. government bonds, out of a 
total foreign currency reserve of around $3 trillion. That sounds like a lot of 
money, but in comparison to the size of its economy and levels of 
international trade, China’s reserves are roughly in line with those of other 
developing countries. It’s also not a particularly large proportion of the 
roughly $22 trillion total U.S. government debt to the world outstanding. 
Alarmists warn that a Chinese dollar dump could send U.S. interest rates 
soaring and the U.S. economy crashing down. Just about everyone else 
understands that the huge market for U.S. Treasury securities, with an 
average daily trading volume of $500 billion in the spot market—and many 
times that in swaps, options, and futures—could easily absorb China’s 
entire reserves. 
Ironically, the biggest victim of any Chinese liquidation of U.S. dollar 
holdings could be the European Union. Any reduction in China’s dollar 
reserves holdings would have to be matched by a corresponding rise in its 
holdings of other currencies, and the euro is the most likely alternative. But 
eurozone government bond trading is much thinner and more fragmented 
than the U.S. Treasurys market. A massive Chinese shift into euros could 
see that currency skyrocketing, placing a massive drag on Europe’s big 
industrial exporters. 
The truth is that China has very little leverage in a trade war with the 
United States. Given Beijing’s bluster, it can be easy to forget that China is 
still a relatively poor country with a GDP per capita less than one-sixth the 
U.S. level. Compared to the America’s, China’s economy is relatively 
inefficient and undifferentiated, and its markets are poorly developed. 
The simple fact is that China needs the United States more than the United 
States needs China. In itself, that’s no reason to start a trade war. But if the 
trade war really does heat up, there’s little doubt who will win. 
 
